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  Dan	   Fleming	   and	   Damion	   Sturm’s	   book	   Media,	   Masculinities	   and	   the	   Machine	  explores	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   passionate	   engagements	   with	   media	   and	  technology	   by	   masculine	   subjects	   effect	   a	   ‘reflexive’	   yet	   ‘constrained’	   disposition.	  The	   authors	   draw	   on	   autoethnographic	   fieldwork	   from	   Sturm’s	   experience	   of	   his	  Formula	   One	   (F1)	   fandom	   and	   engage	  with	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   Transformers	  franchise	   (from	   children’s	   toys	   to	   young	   adult	   fandom	   and	   the	   intricacies	   of	  multigenerational	   fandom)	   as	   their	   primary	   examples.	   Each	   chapter	   of	   the	   book	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largely	   involves	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   carrying	   out	   a	   kind	   of	   archaeological	  manoeuvre,	   digging	   through	   the	   levels	   of	   representation	   to	   arrive	   at	   what	   they	  describe	   as	   the	   underlying	   substrate	   of	   affect	   and	   examine	   the	   ways	   a	   particular	  vitality	  of	  affect	  is	  materialised	  in	  (technological)	  objects.	  The	  key	  contribution	  this	  book	  makes	   is	   to	  a	  non-­‐representational	  media	  theory	  that	   teases	  out	   the	  complex	  interrelation	   between	   mediated	   elements	   (texts,	   objects,	   and	   so	   forth)	   in	   the	  ‘affective	   substrate’	   of	   culture.	   I	   am	   focusing	   on	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   book	   in	   this	  review,	   rather	   than	   the	   book’s	   other	   (minor)	   focus	   in	   chapter	   six	   on	   the	   relation	  between	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  symbolic	  in	  the	  circulation	  of	  	  ‘boys	  toys’	  and	  gadgets	  within	  popular	  culture.	  	  The	  first	  three	  chapters	  mediate	  the	  problem	  of	  representation	  and	  experience	  through	   the	   presentation	   of	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm’s	   own	   respective	   stories.	   I	   found	  reading	   the	   third	   chapter,	   ‘The	   Scene	   of	   Autoaffection’	   (thus	   titled	   with	   what	   I	  suspect	   is	   deliberate	   irony),	   particularly	   difficult.	   This	   chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   a	  dialogue	  between	  the	  authors	  that	  begins	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter’s	  autobiographical	   stories	   (which	   are	   designed	   to	   present	   examples	   of	   ‘affective	  labour’).	  (59)	  The	  third	  chapter	  is	  an	  extended	  performative	  example	  of	  the	  tension	  explicitly	  captured	  by	  Fleming	  (or	  at	  least	  the	  ‘DF’	  character)	  when	  he	  writes:	  the	  key	  question	  is	  whether	  we	  are	  thinking	  of	  ourselves	  as	  preconstituted	  individuals,	   with	   exposure	   of	   those	   selves	   as	   the	   object	   of	  autoethnographic	   attention,	   or	   instead	   we	   are	   thinking	   of	   a	   set	   of	   daily	  practices	  and	  discourses	  that	  constitute	  the	  site	  of	  the	  ‘self’.	  (61)	  The	   ‘argument’	   unfolds	   in	   the	   third	   chapter	   across	   and	   between	   the	   dialogue	  between	  the	  two	  authors,	  as	  does	  (a	  certain	  representation	  of)	  the	  affective	   labour	  in	  developing	  the	  argument(s).	  Hence,	  the	  irony	  of	  ‘The	  Scene	  of	  Autoaffection’:	  the	  ‘scene’	   is	   not	   (only)	   a	   café	   in	   New	   Zealand	   as	   described	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  chapter,	   but	   in	   the	   (endlessly	   deferred,	   tele-­‐technological)	   autoaffection	   of	   the	  
reader	   implicated	   in	  Fleming	   and	  Sturm’s	   argument.	   (This	   is	  what	  Greg	   Seigworth	  means	   when	   he	   describes	   the	   book	   as	   a	   ‘book-­‐machine’	   in	   the	   book’s	   back-­‐cover	  material.)	   I	   begin	   with	   this	   problematic—autoethnographic	   ‘me’	   as	   a	   masculine	  subject	   engaging	   with	   an	   ‘interpellating’	   technological	   ‘gadget’	   (scholarly	   text)—because	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   explore	   this	   question	   of	   whether	   masculine	   subjects,	  already	  fully	  or	  partially	  realised	  and	  to	  what	  degree,	  engage	  with	  technology,	  or	  are	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masculine	   subjects	   constituted	   through	   specific	   kinds	   of	   social	   relations	   with	  technology.	  I	  had	  to	  remember	  how	  to	  read	  with	  patience	  (and	  patience	  is	  required	  when	   being	   implicated	   in	   someone	   else’s	   ‘autoaffection’)	   so	   as	   to	   properly	  appreciate	  their	  argument.	  The	  contribution	   to	  non-­‐representational	   theory	  begins	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	  as	  an	  account	  of	   the	  active	  practice	  of	  surrendering	  to	  the	  particular	  constellations	  of	  affective	   intensities	   constituting	   the	   ‘nesting	   loops’	   of	   popular	   culture.	   (35)	   The	  nesting	  loops	  of	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm’s	  examples	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  argument	  operate	  like	   the	   differentiated	   serial	   copper	   windings	   of	   an	   inductor	   used	   to	  electromagnetically	  align	  electrical	  signals.	  Here	  is	  a	  sample:	  	  1. The	   fan-­‐induced	   pleasure	   of	   watching	   Jacques	   Villeneuve	   take	   a	   specific	  corner	  of	  F1	  track	  Eau	  Rouge	  ‘flat	  out’;	  2. The	  musical	  track	  ‘Jacques,	  Move	  Your	  Body	  (Make	  Me	  Sweat)’	  by	  Jacques	  Lu	  Cont	   (a.k.a.	   Stuart	   Price)	   and	   its	   sampling	   of	   1980s	   Detroit	   electro	   band	  Cybertron;	  3. The	   use	   ‘Jacques,	   Move	   Your	   Body’	   in	   a	   2004	   Citroën	   car	   commercial	  involving	  a	  transforming	  and	  dancing	  robot;	  4. A	   further	   series	   of	   dancing/moving	   car/robot	   commercials	   and	   the	  technological	  means	  used	  to	  produce	  them.	  This	   section	   exemplifies	   their	   general	   method,	   ‘working	   back	   through	  representations	  in	  order	  to	  track	  the	  affective	  substrate’.	  (xv)	  They	  later	  isolate	  the	  key	   problematic	   of	   the	   ‘non-­‐representational	   affective	   layer	   [they]	   are	   looking	   to	  trace	  may	  significantly	  disrespect	  such	  boundaries'	  between	  different	  cultural	  texts	  and	  sites.	  (190)	  To	   help	   the	   reader	   grapple	   with	   some	   of	   the	   inherent	   complexity	   of	   non-­‐representational	  relations	  and	  process	  and	  relations-­‐in-­‐process,	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm	  dub	   this	   cultural	   articulation	   as	   the	   ‘Android	   Imaginaire’.	  A	   central	   concept	   in	   the	  book,	  the	  Android	  Imaginaire	   is	  defined,	  in	  part,	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Donna	  Haraway’s	  notion	   of	   the	   cyborg.	   Instead	   of	   working	   against	   gendered	   and	   scientific	   essen-­‐tialisms	  (as	  per	  the	  ‘ironic’	  cyborg),	  so	  that	  the	  ‘cyborg	  is	  a	  condensed	  image	  of	  both	  imagination	   and	  material	   reality,’1	   the	   Android	   Imaginaire	   is	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm’s	  answer	   to	   Haraway’s	   question,	   ‘What	   about	  men’s	   access	   to	   daily	   competence,	   to	  knowing	  how	  to	  build	  things,	  to	  take	  them	  apart,	  to	  play?’	  Rather	  than	  the	  leaking	  of	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boundaries	  represented	  by	  the	  cyborg,	  the	  android	  is	  a	  more	  direct	  surrendering	  of	  the	  human	  to	  the	  machine.	  (28)	  	  They	   concern	   themselves	  with	   the	   relation	   between	   ‘grace’	   and	   ‘tools’	   at	   the	  different	   levels	   of	   analysis	   to	   think	   about	   this	   Android	   Imaginaire.	   For	   example,	  Villeneuve’s	   grace	   taking	   the	   corner	  while	   using	   the	   tool	   of	   the	  F1	   race	   car	   or	   the	  grace	  of	  dancer’s	  body	   in	   the	  motion	  capture	  device	   for	   the	  Citroën	  advertisement	  transduced	   to	   the	  screen	   through	   the	  movements	  of	   the	  CGI	   robot.	   (34)	   (‘Grace’	   is	  mentioned	  a	  number	  of	   times	  throughout	   the	  book	  after	  being	   introduced	  on	  page	  34,	   but	   not	   defined	   in	   any	   succinct	   manner	   until	   page	   189;	   I	   could	   see	   how	   this	  definition	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  discussion	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  pages	  earlier.)	  This	   notion	   of	   ‘grace’	   is	   important	   because	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   suggest	   that	  Gumbrecht’s	   correlative	   notion	   of	   ‘fascination’	   captures	   a	   sense	   of	   how	   fans	   of	  technology	   relate	   to	   the	   ‘grace’	   of	   such	   technology	   (toys,	   motorsport,	   CGI)	   in	  different	   ways.	   Gumbrecht	   argues	   that	   through	   ‘this	   ability	   to	   fascinate,	   sports	  exerts	  a	  transfiguring	  power,	  drawing	  his	  [or	  her]	  gaze	  to	  things	  he	  [or	  she]	  would	  not	  normally	  appreciate.’2	  	  Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   connect	   Gumbrecht’s	   position	   regarding	   the	   ability	   of	  ‘grace’	   to	   ‘fascinate’	   with	   Baudrillard’s	   critical	   appraisal	   of	   consumer	   practices	   as	  manifesting	  banal	  or	  fatal	  strategies	  for	  a	  consumer’s	  wilful	  (if	  ironic)	  surrender	  to	  a	  given	  socio-­‐technological	  site	  of	   fan	   individuation.	  Writing	  about	  Formula	  One	  and	  metal	  music,	  they	  argue	  that:	  Both	  offer	  a	  wall	  of	  sound	  and	  a	   flurry	  of	  speed	  that	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  representationally	  elaborated,	  although	  of	  course	  it	  is:	  their	  intensity	  first	  grips	   people	   in	   an	   uncomplicated,	   direct,	   and	   vivid	   manner.	   Affect	  materialises	  as	  an	  intense	  soundscape	  and	  spectacle	  of	  speed.	  (57)	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  agree	  with	  this.	  There	  are	  particular	  (sub)cultural	  practices	  that	  non-­‐fans,	   non-­‐enthusiasts	   or	   non-­‐participants	   find	   abrasive,	   distasteful,	   boring	   and	  generally	   a	   negative	   experience.	   The	   capacity	   to	   be	   open	   to	   the	   experience	   of	  Formula	   One	   or	   metal—their	   intensities—is	   surely	   a	   question	   of	   comportment	  (habitus	  and	  so	  on),	  but	  also	  in	  the	  way	  that	  participants	  need	  to	  become	  gradually	  immersed.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  a	  necessary	  critical	  disposition	  by	  fans,	  but	  more	  an	  appreciation	  of	  taste	  as	  a	  performative	  practice	  involving	  the	  mastery	  of	  techniques	  and	  socio-­‐technologies	  of	  fandom.3	  	  
	   	  VOLUME19 NUMBER1MAR2013	  326 
	  Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   invert	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	   respective	   events	   into	   the	  lounge	  room,	  so	  the	  ‘fascination’	  of	  the	  viewer	  (what	  they	  are	  documenting	  in	  their	  ethnographic	  work)	  projects	  back	  onto	  the	  technology:	  Where	   Villeneuve	   did	   not	   have	   time	   to	   think,	   thanks	   to	   the	   charmed	  technology	   of	   speed	   and	   aerodynamics,	   the	   robot-­‐car	   has	   no	   means	   to	  think.	  And	  yet	  the	  grace	  of	  human	  presence	  is	  still	  there,	  thanks	  in	  this	  case	  to	  the	  charmed	  technology	  of	  motion	  capture.	  (24)	  What	   does	   ‘does	   not	   have	   time	   to	   think’	   or	   ‘no	   means	   to	   think’	   mean?	   The	  projection	   of	   human	   intellectual	   capabilities	   onto	   a	   complex	   socio-­‐technical	  assemblage	   involving	  complex	  distributions	  of	  agency	   is	  simplistic.	  Formula	  One	   is	  complicated	  by	  there	  being	  a	  ‘live’	  event	  somewhere,	  but	  the	  Citroën	  advertisements	  (mentioned	   above)	   are	   massively	   more	   complicated	   if	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘liveness’	   is	  
imagined	   as	   distributed	   across	   multiple	   production	   sites	   and	   networks	   of	   socio-­‐technical	   agency	   in	   its	   production.	   Like	   Villeneuve	   taking	   the	   corner,	   the	   dancing	  robot’s	   grace	   is	   a	   special	   effect	   of	   the	   complex	   socio-­‐technical	   network	   that	   is	  required	  to	  produce	  it.	  The	  tension	  here	  is	  between	  what	  is	  actually	  being	  repeated	  for	   the	   Formula	   One	   or	   Transformers	   fans—the	   ‘grace’	   exhibited	   by	   the	   object	   of	  their	   ‘fascination’	   or	   the	   process	   of	   individuation	   through	   the	   (impersonal)	  experience	  of	  being	   ‘fascinated’	   catalysed	  by	  a	   combination	  of	   specific	  material	   (a-­‐signifying)	  signs?	  	  Intensity	  is	  defined	  in	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm’s	  glossary	  as	  the	  ‘degree	  of	  potential	  that	   the	   body	   has	   for	   affective	   engagement	   with	   objects’.	   (212)	   For	   them	   it	   is	   a	  question	   of	   the	   intensity	   of	   affect	   as	   a	   degree	   of	   ‘fascination’	  with	   the	   ‘grace’	   of	   a	  technological	   ensemble.	   Another	   theoretical	   line	   (via	  Bergson,	  Deleuze,	   Simondon,	  Massumi)	  maps	  how	  the	  intensive	  dimension	  of	  mediated	  experiences	  in	  part	  work	  to	   account	   for	   the	   way	   the	   viewer-­‐body	   is	   individuated.	   There	   is	   an	   important	  difference	   here.	   The	   concept	   of	   an	   ‘affective	   substrate’	   is	   primarily	   understood	   by	  Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   (88–9)	   following	   Grossberg’s	   work	   where	   it	   functions	   as	   an	  quantitative	  intensity	  that	  is	  invested	  by	  ‘fans’,	  albeit	  inverted	  here	  so	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  sublime	   grace	   of	   the	   object	   that	   manifests	   intensity;	   as	   they	   write	   in	   an	   example	  about	   sound	   'affect	  materialises	  as	  an	   intense	  soundscape'.	   (57)	  Such	  an	  approach	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pushes	   to	   the	   background	   those	   event-­‐based	   dimensions	   of	   experience;	   this	  includes,	  but	  is	  not	  limited	  to:	  1.	  Affect	  that	  circulates	  across	  homosocial	  bodies	  in-­‐relation	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  glue,	  such	  as	  in	  Eve	  Sedgwick’s	  work	  on	  ‘homosociality’;4	  	  2.	  Relations	  of	  excitement	  or	  disappoint	  relating	   to	   future	  or	  past	  events,	  such	   as	   Paul	   Hodkinson’s	   work	   on	   Goth	   subcultures	   and	   the	   role	   of	  events	  in	  their	  fandom;5	  	  3.	   The	   differential	   repetition	   of	   childhood	   experience	   as	   an	   adult	   to	  manifest	   childlike	   emotional	   responses,	   which	   could	   be	   thought	   of	   in	  this	  context	  as	  affective	   ‘nesting	  loops’	  of	  the	  habitus.	  See,	   for	  example,	  Felix	  Guattari’s	  interpretation	  of	  Daniel	  Stern’s	  work.6	  	  An	   example	   of	   the	   simple	   representation	   of	   the	   qualitative	   shifts	   in	   affective	  relations	   within	   which	   technological	   objects	   find	   themselves	   is	   the	   Gartner	   Hype	  Cycle.7	  It	  tracks	  the	  different	  affective	  states	  that	  a	  single	  ‘technology’	  (Gartner	  has	  a	  sophisticated	  definition	  of	   technology,	   it	   is	  not	   a	   simple	  object),	   from	   the	  peaks	  of	  ‘hype’	   to	   diminished	   ‘disappointment’	   to	   stable	   ‘trust’.	   Gartner	   works	   to	   help	  capitalists	  make	   investment	   decisions	   so	   as	   to	  minimise	   risk.	   These	   phases	   in	   the	  ‘hype	   cycle’	   indicate	   different	   compositions	   of	   relations	   and	   qualitatively	   different	  affective	   relations.	   The	   key	   difference	   here	   is	   that	   the	   immanent	   and	   mobile	  compositions	   of	   affective	   relationships	   individuate	   individuals	   and	   collectively	  individuate	   entire	   cohorts	   (audiences,	   target	   markets	   and	   so	   on)	   instead	   of	  individuals	  using	  ‘affective	  relationships	  to	  anchor,	  move	  and	  re-­‐anchor	  themselves	  in	  an	  ongoing	  way	  within	  specific	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  circumstances’.	  (89)	  ‘Reflexive	   deliberation’	   that	   qualifies	   ‘their	   intensities’	   (89)	   is	   not	   enough,	  because	   the	   individual	   has	   already	   been	   individuated	   as	   such—the	   post-­‐Kantian	  point	   being	   made	   here	   is	   that	   the	   capacity	   for	   reflexivity	   (critical	   judgement)	   is	  already	  after	  (and	  before	  and	  at	  the	  same	  ‘time’)	  the	  sensations	  of	  one’s	  one	  affective	  comportment	   and	   the	   affects	   circulating	   through	   the	   media.	   Excitement	   over	   the	  latest	  gadget	  or	  Transformers	  film	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  product	  of	  the	  gadget	  or	  film;	  there	  is	   a	   massive	   media	   apparatus	   of	   techniques	   and	   technologies	   designed	   to	   induce	  ‘excitement’	  as	  the	  ‘excited	  individual’;	  it	  is	  the	  ‘excited	  individual’	  that	  pre-­‐books	  or	  pre-­‐orders	  the	  ‘next’	  thing.	  From	  Silvan	  Tomkins	  we	  know	  that	  excitement	  is	  but	  one	  co-­‐assembly	  of	  affect	  and	  desire;8	  its	  manifestation	  in	  (masculine)	  bodies	  is	  through	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the	   mobilisation	   of	   these	   bodies,	   these	   bodies	   might	   be	   more	   responsive	   to	   such	  technics	   of	   excitement,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   collective	   process	   through	  which	   the	   activation	  contours	  of	  excitement	  individuates	  ‘fans’	  and	  ‘blockbusters’.	  	  Furthermore,	   by	   analysing	   the	   representational	   layer	   to	   anchor	   the	   affective,	  are	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm	  not	   ‘fatal’	  (in	  Baudrillard’s	  sense)	  enough	  in	  their	  strategy?	  Without	   a	  doubt	   such	  a	   slippage	  actually	  occurs	   for	   some	   in	   the	   audience,	   but	   the	  conditions	  by	  which	  this	  projection	  back	  from	  representation	  to	  ‘fascination’	  occurs	  cannot	  be	  assumed.	  I	  agree	  with	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm	  that	  there	  is	  a	  complex	  passage	  (or	  ‘non-­‐local	  linkage’)9	  between	  events	  of	  experience,	  which	  they	  indicate	  may	  not	  be	  apparent	  through	  any	  normative	  representational	  structure	  or	  straightforward	  in	  terms	  of	   ‘identity’,	  but	   tracing	   this	   through	   the	  representational	   layer	  assumes	   too	  much	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  representational	  text	   itself.	  Fleming	  and	  Sturm	  are	  clearly	  aware	  of	  this	  point	  when	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	   ‘nonrepresentational	  affective	   layer	  we	   are	   looking	   to	   trace	   may	   significantly	   disrespect	   such	   boundaries’	   between	  popular	   genres	   forms	   such	   as	   Transformers	   and	   Formula	  One.	   (190)	  Why	   stop	   at	  boundaries	  between	  genres	  of	  popular	  culture?	  It	  seems	  that	  if	  there	  can	  be	  such	  a	  connection	   between	   the	   fan’s	   investment	   in	   Formula	   One	   and	   the	   Transformers	  franchise,	   then	   why	   not	   such	   a	   connection	   between	   the	   layers	   of	   subjectivity,	  between	  the	  intensities	  of	  memory	  and	  amodal	  embodiment	  of	  any	  number	  of	  past	  (and	  possibly	  future,	  unfolding)	  events	  that	  constitute	  the	  transversal	  movement	  of	  affect	  through	  experience?	  	  These	   theoretical	   quibbles,	   although	   not	   minor,	   should	   not	   preclude	  researchers	   interested	   in	   affect	   and	   the	   media	   from	   engaging	   with	   Fleming	   and	  Sturm’s	   text.	   Curiously,	   Fleming	   and	   Sturm	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   banality	   of	   their	  research	   objects	   when	   they	   ask	   the	   question	   of	   what	   happens	   when	   ‘interests	   in	  motor	   racing	   fandom	   and	   boys’	   toys’	   seem	   to	   tell	   a	   story	   ‘not	   just	   of	   the	   de-­‐radicalized	  banality	  of	  the	  humanities	  in	  the	  technocratic	  university,	  but	  of	  how	  the	  field	  of	  cultural	  studies	  has	  eventually	  disappeared	  up	  its	  own	  trivia?’	  Their	  answer	  is	  disarmingly	  honest:	  ‘This	  small	  book	  is	  what	  happens’.	  (2)	  	   —	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